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Insult to Injury: A Constitutional 
Challenge to Rhode Island’s Most 
Colorful Shaming 
Breegan Semonelli* 
INTRODUCTION 
Every school year, University of Rhode Island students 
overwhelm the sand-ridden neighborhoods of Narragansett, and 
their considerable presence does not go unnoticed.1  The student 
residents typically stake their claim in the otherwise quiet 
neighborhoods until the end of May and the dissatisfaction of the 
year-round Narragansett residents is no secret.2  Disgruntled 
town residents brought their concerns before the town council and, 
in response, the town enacted a municipal ordinance to control 
and ultimately ban the students’ so-called “unruly gatherings.”3  
The ordinance serves as a scarlet letter of sorts,4 requiring that 
violators display an orange sticker on the face of their rental 
 
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Roger Williams University School of Law, 2017.   
 1.  Sheree R. Curry, Noisy Neighbors Get Noticed in Narragansett, AOL 
REAL EST. (Jan. 11, 2011, 5:07 PM), http://web.archive.org/web/20150908 
115822/http://realestate.aol.com/blog/2011/01/11/noisy-neighbors-get-noticed-
in-narragansett. 
 2.  See URI Student Senate v. Town of Narragansett, 707 F. Supp. 2d 
282, 288 (D.R.I. 2010) (“The Town Council blames student renters for 
throwing rowdy parties that encourage lawbreaking, such as underage 
drinking and fighting.”). 
 3.  Id.  See NARRAGANSETT, R.I., CODE ORDINANCES ch. 46, art. 2, § 32 
(2007) [hereinafter Ordinance], http://www.narragansettri.gov/Document 
Center/Home/View/151. 
 4.  The phrase “scarlet letter” is derived from Nathaniel Hawthorne’s 
classic of American literature.  See NATHANIEL HAWTHORNE, THE SCARLET 
LETTER (Thomas E. Connolly ed., Penguin Classics 2015) (1850). 
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property for the remainder of the year.5 
Aggrieved student residents challenged the constitutionality 
of this ordinance in state court, seeking relief from the colorful 
repercussions that the ordinance imposes.6  In URI Student 
Senate v. Town of Narragansett, the students asserted that the 
ordinance was unconstitutional on several grounds, including that 
it violated the notice and opportunity-to-be-heard requirements of 
procedural due process.7  After removal to federal court, both the 
United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island and 
the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held, 
seemingly reluctantly,8 that the ordinance was indeed 
constitutional under the controlling standard for procedural due 
process—the “stigma-plus standard.”9  Developed by the Supreme 
Court of the United States, the stigma-plus standard provides 
that harm or injury to an individual’s interest in reputation, even 
when inflicted by an officer of the state, “does not result in a 
deprivation of any ‘liberty’ or ‘property’ recognized by state or 
federal law” and, therefore, does not invoke the constitutional 
protection of the due process clause.10  In short, under the stigma-
plus standard, harm to reputation alone is insufficient to invoke 
due process protection.11  To satisfy the “plus” of stigma-plus 
standard, the harm to reputation must be paired with proof that 
steps taken by “a government actor adversely impact[ed] a right or 
status previously enjoyed under state law.”12 
 
 5.  URI Student Senate, 707 F. Supp. 2d at 289.  Notably, the District 
Court “agree[d] that receiving an orange sticker might be humiliating.”  Id. at 
297. 
 6.  Id. at 290–91. 
 7.  Id. at 291.  
 8.   Id. at 302 (“[T]he result sits uneasily with the Court”); URI Student 
Senate v. Town of Narragansett, 631 F.3d 1, 11–12 (1st Cir. 2011) (“Let us be 
perfectly clear.  We, like the district court, are uneasy about the absence of a 
hearing.”). 
 9.  URI Student Senate, 631 F.3d at 11–12 (“[T]he appellants have failed 
to demonstrate . . . that any of the incremental harms to which they point in 
the hope of satisfying the requirements of the stigma plus standard 
inevitably results from the Ordinance’s implementation.”); URI Student 
Senate, 707 F. Supp. 2d at 303 (“The Court is at a loss for any way to put 
Plaintiffs’ injuries into a legal box other than purely reputational harms.”). 
 10.  Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 712 (1976). 
 11.  See id. 
 12.  Pendleton v. City of Haverhill, 156 F.3d 57, 63 (1st Cir. 1998) (citing 
Paul, 424 U.S. at 708-09). 
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Because the student plaintiffs were unable to meet their 
burden in satisfying the requisite “plus” requirement, their action 
failed in federal court.13  Left without recourse, student residents 
and their landlords are forced to display orange stickers on their 
targeted rental properties until the end of the year, proclaiming 
their misbehavior to the community despite the absence of notice 
or a hearing prior to the sticker’s imposition.  Though the orange 
sticker’s purported intent is to deter the feared “unruly 
gatherings,” the practical effect of the punitive ordinance is to 
shame the violators.14  To put it simply, the student parties 
continue and the only change is that the renters and landlords are 
stigmatized. 
The Narragansett sticker ordinance illuminates a major gap 
in the protection that procedural due process is purported to 
afford: “before the government can deprive a person of a protected 
interest, it must provide [him or] her with notice and opportunity 
to be heard.”15  The stigma-plus standard left the student 
plaintiffs unprotected because they were provided with no notice 
and no hearing to defend their actions despite the sticker’s 
stigmatizing effect.  Due to this gap, the stigma-plus standard 
should be reconsidered in favor of affording broader protection to 
those suffering stigmatization from punishment imposed by the 
government, especially when the stigmatization is the result of 
official action required by law.  While providing notice and a 
hearing would certainly bring the ordinance into closer alignment 
with the constitutional mandates of due process, even with these 
additional protections, the ordinance still is inappropriate.  The 
orange sticker ordinance is simply an unfitting punishment 
because it employs the same shaming tactics as the ever-prevalent 
criminal shame punishments, which, though debatable in their 
own right, are typically reserved for more severe situations than 
 
 13.  URI Student Senate, 631 F.3d at 12; URI Student Senate, 707 F. 
Supp. 2d at 298. 
 14.  See ACLU Sues Narragansett Over “Orange Sticker” Policy, ACLU 
R.I. (May 23, 2008), http://riaclu.org/news/archive-post/aclu-sues-
narragansett-over-orange-sticker-policy (“The URI Student Senate has 
condemned the ‘orange sticker policy’ as a discriminatory policy aimed at 
students to shame them, much like a ‘scarlet letter.’”). 
 15.  RHONDA WASSERMAN, PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS: A REFERENCE GUIDE 
TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 1 (2004). 
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college parties.16 
This comment seeks to elucidate the large gap that the 
stigma-plus standard creates in procedural due process 
protections, to demonstrate that the shaming effect of 
Narragansett’s ordinance is inappropriate, and to provide a 
practical alternative that municipalities could employ to deter 
these so-called unruly gatherings.  Part I of this comment will 
discuss the significant interest an individual has in preserving his 
or her reputation and the historical development in procedural 
due process.  Part II will elaborate on the growing prevalence of 
colonial-style shame punishments in judicial sentencing and the 
potential harm of that stigmatization.  Finally, Part III will 
discuss the aforementioned as applied to the Rhode Island 
municipal orange sticker ordinance and provide feasible and 
constitutionally sound alternatives to the ordinance that would 
alleviate said stigmatization. 
I.  THE HISTORICAL IMPORTANCE OF REPUTATION WITH PROCEDURAL 
DUE PROCESS 
A.  Development of Procedural Due Process 
Due process is incorporated in the Fifth and the Fourteenth 
amendments of the United States Constitution, where the 
Constitution provides that neither the federal government nor 
state governments can deprive a person of life, liberty, or property 
without due process of law.17  Due process has been interpreted as 
encompassing two different doctrines—substantive due process 
and procedural due process.18  Substantive due process deals 
specifically with the adequacy of the government’s reason for 
 
 16.  See discussion infra Section II.B.  
 17.  U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV. 
 18.  Id.  In United States v. Salerno, the Court explained: 
[T]he Due Process Clause protects individuals against two types of 
government action.  So-called “substantive due process” prevents the 
government from engaging in conduct that “shocks the conscience,” 
or interferes with rights “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.”  
When government action depriving a person of life, liberty, or 
property survives substantive due process scrutiny, it must still be 
implemented in a fair manner.  This requirement has traditionally 
been referred to as “procedural” due process. 
481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987) (citations omitted). 
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taking a person’s life, liberty, or property.19  Procedural due 
process, on the other hand, considers whether the government 
conducted such deprivation in a “fair manner.”20 
Interpretations of the exact rights afforded by due process, 
particularly procedural due process, have been extensive and the 
analysis of procedural due process protections afforded to those 
who have suffered harm to their reputation is no exception.21  
Reputation is defined broadly as “[t]he esteem in which a person is 
held by others.”22  It may appear that reputation, on its face, is 
not as important of a concern as other interests that traditionally 
have been associated with due process violations, like property for 
instance.  Damage to one’s reputation, however, is a significant 
legal interest because, unlike other traditional interests, injury to 
one’s reputation cannot be easily remedied with monetary 
damages.  Instead, a person injured by government stigmatization 
has intangible damages, which are virtually impossible to 
quantify because damages arising from stigmatization cannot be 
quantified in the same way as damages to one’s property.  This 
difficulty, perhaps, makes reputation an even more significant 
legal interest.  The Supreme Court conclusions on the topic have 
varied and when analyzing whether the government can harm an 
individual’s reputation without violating due process, the Court’s 
rulings seem to be anything but uniform.  Two benchmark cases 
exemplify the Court’s variation: Paul v. Davis23 and Wisconsin v. 
Constantineau.24 
In Constantineau, a statute gave the chief of police the right 
to post notices in local businesses prohibiting the sale of goods to 
persons “who ‘by excessive drinking’ produce[d] described 
conditions or exhibit[ed] specified traits, such as exposing himself 
or family ‘to want’ or becoming ‘dangerous to the peace’ of the 
 
 19.  See id.; Erwin Chemerinsky, Procedural Due Process Claims, 16 
TOURO L. REV. 871, 871 (2000). 
 20.  Salerno, 481 U.S. at 746. 
 21.  See generally Eric J. Mitnick, Procedural Due Process and 
Reputational Harm: Liberty as Self-Invention, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 79 
(2009). 
 22.   Reputation, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (3d pocket ed. 2006); OXFORD 
ADVANCED LEARNER’S DICTIONARY, http://www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/ 
us/definition/english/reputation. 
 23.  424 U.S. 693 (1976). 
 24.  400 U.S. 433 (1971). 
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community.”25  The plaintiff was denied the opportunity to contest 
the inclusion of her name on the prohibition list and that the state 
failed to provide her with notice that her name would be included 
on the list.26  The Supreme Court held that, to some, the posting is 
a private interest and “such a stigma or badge of disgrace that 
procedural due process requires notice and an opportunity to be 
heard.”27  The Court was explicit that harm to an individual’s 
reputation implicated procedural due process concerns, explaining 
that “[w]here a person’s good name, reputation, honor, or integrity 
is at stake because of what the government is doing to him, notice 
and an opportunity to be heard are essential.”28 
The stigma standard developed in Constantineau triggered a 
procedural due process analysis for reputational harms and 
Constantineau remained the standard for due process violations 
caused by stigma for five years until the Court heightened the 
standard in Paul.29  Rejecting the stigma standard bright-line rule 
in Constantineau, the Supreme Court narrowed the interpretation 
of procedural due process and created the “stigma-plus” standard 
of procedural due process in Paul v. Davis.30 
Like the plaintiff in Constantineau, the plaintiff in Paul 
claimed that the government infringed on his due process rights 
by circulating a flyer implicating him of a criminal charge.31  The 
state charged the plaintiff with shoplifting and the plaintiff pled 
not guilty.32  Despite the fact that the plaintiff was still presumed 
innocent, the government nonetheless prepared and circulated a 
flyer that identified the plaintiff as an “active shoplifter.”33  As a 
result of the flyer, the plaintiff’s supervisor informed the plaintiff 
 
 25.  Id. at 434–35. 
 26.  Id.; see Constantineau v. Grager, 302 F. Supp. 861, 862-63 (E.D. Wis. 
1969).  
 27.  Constantineau, 400 U.S. at 436. 
 28.  Id. at 437.  
 29.  See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 708–09 (1976).  Notably, lower court 
decisions after Constantineau, but prior to Paul, appeared unwavering on the 
question of a reputational interest in due process protection.  See, e.g., Suarez 
v. Weaver, 484 F.2d 678, 680 (7th Cir. 1973) (“There is little doubt but that a 
person’s interest in his reputation is sufficient to trigger procedural due 
process protection.”). 
 30.  See Paul, 424 U.S. at 708–09; Mitnick, supra note 21, at 91. 
 31.  See Paul, 424 U.S. at 695–97. 
 32.  Id. at 695. 
 33.  Id. 
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that “he ‘had best not find himself in a similar situation’ in the 
future.”34  Shortly thereafter, the state dismissed the charges 
against the plaintiff and the plaintiff sought redress for a violation 
of his constitutional rights.35 
The plaintiff argued that the circulation of the flyer 
impermissibly denied him constitutionally guaranteed due process 
of law. 36  However, the Court rejected plaintiff’s arguments—
although similar to those of the Constantineau plaintiff—and 
ultimately narrowed the Court’s previous standard.37  The court 
held that harm to reputation alone does not infringe on a 
constitutionally protected liberty interest, reasoning that while 
the state (in this case, Kentucky) allowed a plaintiff to file 
defamation actions to challenge reputational harm, “Kentucky law 
[did] not extend to respondent any legal guarantee of present 
enjoyment of reputation which has been altered as a result of 
petitioners’ actions.”38  The Court noted that the weight of their 
decisions established no precedent that would convert every claim 
of defamation by a state official into a constitutional claim.39  The 
Court applied the stigma-plus standard, explaining that while 
reputation interests are protected by state tort law, such interests 
are not protected by procedural due process.40  Leaving no room 
for ambiguity, the Court stated that “any harm or injury to that 
[reputational] interest, even where as here inflicted by an officer 
of the State, does not result in a deprivation of any ‘liberty’ or 
‘property’ recognized by state or federal law.”41  The Court 
justified its narrowing of Constantineau in Paul by characterizing 
Constantineau as having satisfied the stigma-plus standard; 
specifically, the Paul Court rationalized that the police chief’s 
 
 34.  Id. at 696. 
 35.  Id. 
 36.  See id. at 696–97; Davis v. Paul, 505 F.2d 1180, 1180 (6th Cir. 1974); 
see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (providing, in part, that a state shall not 
drive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law). 
 37.  See Paul, 474 U.S. at 701–02.  The Court did not expressly overrule 
Constantineau, but rather purported to interpret its “ambiguous[ly]” worded 
central holding.  Id. at 708–09.  This reinterpretation has been criticized as 
fallacious by several commentators.  Mitnick, supra note 21, at 91–92; see 
also infra note 43 and accompanying text. 
 38.  Paul, 424 U.S. at 711–12. 
 39.  Id. at 702. 
 40.  See id. at 711–12. 
 41.  Id. at 712. 
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actions in Constantineau not only stigmatized that plaintiff, but 
also prevented her from purchasing alcohol, which satisfied as a 
“plus” in accordance with the stigma-plus standard.42 
B.  Backlash of Changing the Reputational Standard 
Despite the Supreme Court’s detailed reasoning, critics 
responded to the Paul decision with strong contention.43  Much of 
that contention focused on the Constantineau Court’s precise 
statement that “[t]he only issue present here is whether the label 
or characterization given a person by ‘posting,’ though a mark of 
serious illness to some, is to others such a stigma or badge of 
disgrace that procedural due process requires notice and an 
opportunity to be heard.”44  The Constantineau Court clearly did 
not apply the stigma-plus standard because it highlighted that the 
only concern was stigmatization, rather than stigmatization “plus” 
another interest.45  The Paul majority, however, rationalized that 
the Constantineau Court did apply the stigma-plus standard.46  
The Paul Court’s blatant “mischaracterization” of the 
Constantineau Court’s rather explicit statement that stigma was 
the “only issue” before it did not sit well with academia.47  Critics 
justifiably dubbed the Court’s interpretation of Constantineau as 
“distressingly fast and loose” and “disingenuous.”48 
 
 42.  Id. at 708–09 (“The ‘stigma’ resulting from the defamatory character 
of the posting was doubtless an important factor in evaluating the extent of 
harm worked by that act, but we do not think that such defamation, standing 
alone, deprived Constantineau of any ‘liberty’ protected by the procedural 
guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment.”). 
 43.  See, e.g., Henry Paul Monaghan, Of “Liberty” And “Property,” 62 
CORNELL L. REV. 405, 426 (1977) (“[I]n a ‘Constitution for a free people,’ it is 
an unsettling conception of ‘liberty’ that protects an individual against state 
interference with his access to liquor but not with his reputation in the 
community.”); Barbara E. Armacost, Race and Reputation: The Real Legacy of 
Paul v. Davis, 85 VA. L. REV. 569, 571 (1999) (“Scholars have been 
relentlessly and uniformly negative in their reactions to the Supreme Court’s 
opinion and holding in Paul . . . .”). 
 44.  Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 436 (1971) (emphasis 
added).  
 45.  See id. 
 46.  See Paul, 424 U.S. at 708–09. 
 47.  Mitnick, supra note 21, at 91–92; Armacost, supra note 43, at 571; 
Rodney A. Smolla, Displacement of Federal Due Process Claims by State Tort 
Remedies: Parratt v. Taylor and Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Company, 1982 
U. ILL. L. REV. 831, 840 (1982). 
 48.  See, e.g., Smolla, supra note 47, at 840. 
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The unrest following the Paul decision was extensive and 
immediate.  The majority opinion in Paul stood before a strong 
dissent from Justice Brennan, which prophesied the very real 
consequences and implications that the Paul decision invited for 
later cases.49  Justice Brennan’s dissent remarked that “[t]he 
potential of today’s decision is frightening for a free people.”50  He 
recognized the constitutional issues that the majority’s decision 
stirred up, observing that the “police here have officially imposed 
on respondent the stigmatizing label ‘criminal’ without the 
salutary and constitutionally mandated safeguards of a criminal 
trial.”51  Continuing, Justice Brennan expressed his concern for 
the constitutional repercussions that the Paul decision would have 
on future reputation-based disputes, noting specifically: 
The logical and disturbing corollary of this holding is that 
no due process infirmities would inhere in a statute 
constituting a commission to conduct ex parte trials of 
individuals, so long as the only official judgment 
pronounced was limited to the public condemnation and 
branding of a person as a Communist, a traitor, an 
“active murderer,” a homosexual, or any other mark that 
“merely” carries social opprobrium.52 
Justice Brennan’s stated concerns for the implications of the 
majority’s decision foretold the backlash that the decision would 
face from those who felt that it was both arbitrary and 
unnecessary.53 
II.  RETURN OF SHAME PUNISHMENTS 
Changing the due process standard applied to reputational 
injuries introduced a number of underlying, yet foreseeable, 
concerns.54  By heightening the standard, the Supreme Court 
created a barrier to constitutional challenges of shame 
punishments, which has contributed to the increased use of 
 
 49.  See Paul, 424 U.S. at 721 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 50.  Id.  
 51.  Id. at 718. 
 52.  Id. at 721. 
 53.  See, e.g., Mitnick, supra note 21, at 93 (“This sacrifice is particularly 
unfortunate, since it was unnecessary.”) 
 54.  See Paul, 424 U.S. at 721 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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government-sponsored shaming tactics.  While the examples of 
shame punishments discussed in this comment are typically the 
result of criminal convictions and Paul v. Davis is inapplicable to 
challenge a criminal sentence,55 the shaming strategies used to 
impose both criminal and civil shame punishments are similar.  
To put it another way, while the challenges to criminal and civil 
shame punishments are based on different grounds, the shaming 
strategy is effectively the same in both contexts.56  Nevertheless, 
even after a hearing, the orange sticker is still an inappropriate 
and ineffective punishment, which makes the failure to provide a 
hearing even more troubling. 
A.  History of Shame Punishments 
Shame has been described as “the loss of face in the eyes of 
neighbors who have the village habit of condemning any kind of 
deviance and from whom one cannot escape.”57  The intent of 
shame punishments in both criminal and civil cases is just that – 
to stigmatize the offender.58  Most modern shaming punishments 
allow the state to express its disapproval of the offender by 
publicly stigmatizing him or her without the physical pain that 
often accompanied earlier shaming laws.59 
American shame punishments are rooted in colonial America, 
where corporal punishments “were meant to inflict both public 
 
 55.  Paul did not involve a criminal sentence, but rather a posting that 
was released without any determination of plaintiff Davis’s guilt or 
innocence.  Paul, 424 U.S. at 695–96. 
 56.  While challenges to the criminal sentences discussed herein would 
focus on whether the shaming serves a valid governmental interest, the civil 
orange sticker at issue here raises the question of whether the recipient has a 
right to a hearing to challenge the sticker. 
 57.  James Q. Whitman, What is Wrong with Inflicting Shame 
Sanctions?. 107 YALE L.J. 1055, 1057 (1998).  Whitman continued to recognize 
that there is no point of shaming individuals “who are likely . . . to move in an 
underworld population that is very far from condemning the deviant.”  Id.  
He further posited that “at its worst, shaming such characters may simply 
force them to renounce law-abiding society entirely, moving into the 
underworld for good.”  Id. 
 58.  See Chad Flanders, Shaming and the Meaning of Punishment, 54 
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 609, 610 & n.4 (2006). 
 59.  See id. at 612; Kenneth C. Haas, Public Shaming as Punishment, in 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS 356, 357 (Shannon M. Barton-
Bellessa ed., 2012) (describing the use of “painful corporal punishments” in 
colonial America) 
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humiliation and intense pain.”60  “The whipping post, the 
branding iron, and the pillory61 were prominently displayed and 
frequently employed in the town-squares of 17th and 18th century 
America.”62  Branding was particularly popular in all of the 
American colonies.63  The shame punishments of colonial America 
continued as the primary means of punishing criminals until the 
ratification of the Bill of Rights in 1791 and the introduction of the 
Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual 
punishment.64 
The Bill of Rights bespoke an era of enlightenment in which 
the appropriateness and effectiveness of 16th- and 17th-century 
methods of shame-and-pain punishment.65  Additionally, the age 
of enlightenment coincided with changing demographic patterns 
that contributed to the decline of shaming punishments for other 
reasons.66  The population increased and residents of the small 
colonial towns began migrating to the cities, which “increased 
anonymity, a greater appreciation of the value of privacy, and a 
decreasing dependence on close community relationships.”67  The 
result of the changing demographic was a prominent decrease in 
shaming punishments because of their perceived 
inappropriateness in the changing American society. 
 
 60.  Haas, supra note 59, at 357.  These types of punishments were 
routinely given to “vagrants, beggars, petty thieves, Sabbath breakers, and 
other minor offenders.”  Id. 
 61.  Haas further explains colonial use of the pillory:  
Political and religious leaders found the pillory (a set of wooden 
frames with holes for the head, hands, and sometimes the feet) to be 
an especially versatile device for inflicting a large dose of shame and 
a requisite measure of pain.  The spectacle of a miscreant helpless in 
its grasp, his head protruding through its beams and his hands 
through two holes, was thought to educate the public as to the 
consequences of sinful behavior and to send a deterrent message to 
both the humiliated lawbreaker and others who might be tempted to 
stray from the strict tenets of colonial moral standards.  Culprits 
could expect to be pelted with ridicule and insults as well as with 
sticks and stones. The more serious misdemeanants were sometimes 
nailed through their ears to the pillory, branded, and shaved bald.  
Id.  
 62.  Id.  
 63.  Id.  
 64.  Id. at 357–58.   
 65.  Id.   
 66.  Id. at 358.  
 67.  Id.   
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B.  Shame Punishment in Modern Society 
However, as of late, shame punishments have become more 
prevalent, with increasing political support.68  Some interpret the 
recurrence of shame punishments as a response to an increased 
desire for expressionism in law.69  Others attribute the return of 
shame punishments in modern America not to a desire for 
expressionism, but rather to the judiciary’s desire for media 
attention.70  However, perhaps a more plausible argument for the 
return of shame punishments, especially in the criminal context, 
is the arguable ineffectiveness of existing punishment methods in 
the American judicial system.71 
Public complaints about our judicial system are unrelenting 
and extensive.72  The increase in the prevalence of shame 
punishments is perhaps attributable, therefore, to this common 
disdain for the criminal justice system.73  Shame punishments 
may be viewed as a result of general dissatisfaction with the 
criminal justice system, as such punishments are arguably a valid 
alternative to imprisonment,74 especially for minor infractions.  
 
 68.  Courtney Guyton Persons, Note, Sex in the Sunlight: The 
Effectiveness, Efficiency, Constitutionality, and Advisability of Publishing 
Names and Pictures of Prostitutes’ Patrons, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1525, 1534 
(1996); Scott E. Sanders, Note, Scarlet Letters, Bilboes and Cable TV: Are 
Shame Punishments Cruel and Outdated or Are They a Viable Option for 
American Jurisprudence?, 37 WASHBURN L.J. 359, 367 (1998). 
 69.  See Flanders, supra note 58, at 611–12 (“The law does not exist 
merely to allocate benefits and burdens; it also says things though its 
actions.”).  See generally Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, 
Expressive Theories of Law: A General Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503 
(2000). 
 70.  See Lynn Debruin, ‘Shame’ Punishments Like Ponytail Cutting 
Increase, DESERET NEWS (June 25, 2012, 12:00 AM), http://www.deseretnews 
.com/article/765585887/Shame-punishments-like-ponytail-cutting-increase 
.html (“Such unconventional sentences that shame defendants are steadily 
increasing and turning state courts into circus shows.”). 
 71.  Toni M. Massaro, Shame, Culture, and American Criminal Law, 89 
MICH. L. REV. 1880, 1884 (1991). 
 72.  Hon. J. Harvie Wilkinson III, In Defense of American Criminal 
Justice, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1099, 1099 (2014) (“The American criminal justice 
system is on trial.  A chorus of commenters—often but not exclusively in the 
legal academy—has leveled a sharp indictment of criminal process in our 
country.”). 
 73.  See Massaro, supra note 71, at 1884. 
 74.  See id. at 1885 (“[D]issatisfaction with the primary punishment 
options [including prison] has led to experimental, creative sanctions and 
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Those who defend shame punishments consider them efficient in 
punishing offenders because shame punishments reflect the 
state’s disapproval of the defendant without the heavy fiscal 
burden that comes with imprisonment.75 
Shaming in criminal sentences comes in the form of ordering 
a defendant to wear a humiliating sign in public.  For example, in 
March 2013, Cleveland, Ohio Municipal Court Judge Pinkey Carr 
ordered a defendant “to stand outside a police station for three 
hours a day for one week with a sign . . . stating ‘I was being an 
idiot and it will never happen again’” after he threatened police 
officers.76  In April 2014, Cleveland municipal Judge Gayle 
Williams-Byer ordered a defendant to stand on a street corner for 
five hours with a sign that stated, “I AM A BULLY!  I pick on 
children that are disabled, and I am intolerant of those that are 
different from myself. My actions do not reflect an appreciation for 
the diverse South Euclid community that I live in.”77  
Additionally, a Georgia judge sentenced a defendant in 2012 to 
wear a sign that said, “I made a fool out of myself on a Bibb 
County Public Schools bus” for one week.78  In December 2013, 
Montana District Judge G. Todd Baugh sentenced a defendant to 
write “Boys do not hit girls” 5,000 times as part of his punishment 
for assaulting his girlfriend.79  In Pennsylvania, a defendant was 
sentenced to stand in front of the courthouse holding a sign that 
read, “I stole from a 9-year-old on her birthday! Don’t steal or this 
could happen to you.”80  In 2010, Harris County, Texas Judge 
Kevin Fine ordered two defendants to stand at a busy intersection 
every weekend for six years holding signs that said “I am a 
thief.”81 
Though the aforementioned examples of criminal shame 
 
probation conditions, which include the ‘shaming and shunning’ practices.”). 
 75.  See, e.g., Aaron S. Book, Shame on You: An Analysis of Modern 
Shame Punishment as an Alternative to Incarceration, 40 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 653, 657 (1999).  
 76.  Id. 
 77.  Id. 
 78.  Id. 
 79.  Id. 
 80.  Id. 
 81.  Id.  The defendants, apparently a married couple, were also 
“required to post a sign in front of their house that included their names and 
said they were convicted thieves.”  Id. 
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punishments appear somewhat childish, they reflect a growing 
trend of using shame as an alternative to incarceration.  
Furthermore, the colorfulness and the public nature of such 
punishments support the notion that the judges believed that 
shaming the individuals might deter them, and others, from 
similar missteps in the future. 
In addition to the apparently constitutional shame 
punishments that have been imposed by judges in recent years, 
there have been multiple instances in which such criminal 
shaming tactics have been called illegal or unconstitutional by 
critics, if not higher courts.82  For example, an Oklahoma judge 
ordered a defendant to attend church for ten years as punishment 
for a DUI manslaughter charge.83  The Oklahoma ACLU had 
condemned the sentence as a “clear violation” of the defendant’s 
First Amendment rights.84  Moreover, in Cameron County, Texas, 
Justice of the Peace Gustavo Garza allowed parents to avoid 
paying a fine if they would instead spank their children in his 
courtroom.85  The State Commission on Judicial Conduct 
determined that Judge Garza exceeded his judicial discretion by 
providing parents with a “safe haven” to impose corporal 
punishment.86  Similarly, in August 2014, a Pennsylvania 
Superior Court struck down a shaming sentence imposed on 
disgraced former state Supreme Court Justice Joan Orie Melvin 
requiring her to send pictures of herself wearing handcuffs to 
judges across the state.87  The Superior Court reasoned that the 
sentence was not “legitimately intended for her rehabilitation,” 
but rather “solely intended to shame her” and, therefore, was not 
authorized by the state’s sentencing code.88 
 
 82.  See id.  
 83.  Id. 
 84.  Id.; Bryan Newell, ACLU of Oklahoma Files Judicial Complaint 
Against Judge for Unconstitutionally Requiring Defendant to Attend Church, 
ACLU OKLA. (Dec. 4, 2012), http://acluok.org/2012/12/aclu-of-oklahoma-files-
judicial-complaint-against-judge-for-unconstitutionally-requiring-defendant-
to-attend-church.  
 85.  David M. Reutter, For Shame! Public Shaming Sentences on the 
Rise, PRISON LEGAL NEWS (Feb. 4, 2015), https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/ 
news/2015/feb/4/shame-public-shaming-sentences-rise/.   
 86.  Id. 
 87.  Id. Id.; Commonwealth v. Melvin, 103 A.3d 1, 56 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
2014). Id. 
 88.  Melvin, 103 A.3d at 55-56. 
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The aforementioned criminal examples reflect that judges 
have been skirting the line between shaming punishments that 
further the notions of justice and those that exceed its boundaries.  
The difference between permissible and impermissible judicially 
sanctioned shaming appears to lie in the extremity of the shame 
associated with the punishment. 
C.  Lasting Effect of Shame Punishments 
While the judiciary has weaved certain elements of shame 
into their sentencing, the resulting harm to one’s reputation is not 
to be taken lightly.89  Presumably, the reason for the arguable 
effectiveness of punitive shaming is the heightened importance 
that individuals place on reputation.90  Public shaming is 
designed to “strip[] . . . the anonymity afforded by modern 
society.”91  “[S]haming penalties threaten not only to degrade the 
offender, but, by enlisting the public as a party to the punishment, 
threaten to bring out the worst in humanity by encouraging the 
public to vent its feelings of hatred and vindictiveness directly 
onto the offender.”92  It is true that criminal shaming 
punishments damage one’s reputation in lieu of constraining one’s 
physical liberty through imprisonment.  “Shaming penalties 
manifest an objective disrespect for the offender by shaming him, 
and they incite subjective attitudes of disrespect by making 
individual citizens instruments of the offender’s punishment.”93 
In reality, the lasting result of stigmatizing an individual is 
 
 89.  Whitman, supra note 57, at 1057 (“Some commentators . . . argue 
that shame sanctions are inordinately cruel to the offender.”) (citing Massaro, 
supra note 71, at 1942–43).   
 90.  See Persons, supra note 68, at 1541–42 (explaining that 
“[p]rospective johns . . . tend to have the status and stake in the community 
that make shame punishments a particularly effective deterrent: loss of self-
esteem and loss of face are apt to be especially unpleasant when a moral 
reputation holds high value.”); see also Book, supra note 75, at 686 (providing 
that “[t]he psychology of shame shows that it is a powerful tool in shaping 
behavior throughout an individual’s lifetime.”). 
 91.  Recent Legislation, Washington State Community Protection Act 
Serves as Model for Other Initiatives by Lawmakers and Communities—1990 
Wash. Laws ch. 3, §§ 101-1406 (Codified as Amended in Scattered Sections of 
Wash. Rev. Code), 108 HARV. L. REV. 787, 790 (1995). 
 92.  Flanders, supra note 58, at 617. 
 93.  See id. at 617–18. 
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much greater than the Paul decision suggested.94  Historically, 
where colonists used public beatings to punish criminals, the 
physical punishment was married with psychological shaming 
that was considered to be the most painful element of the 
penalty.95  In fact, “authorities often felt free to dispense with the 
punishment’s physical component entirely: some offenders were 
required simply to stand in public with signs cataloging their 
crimes, a punishment that relied solely on mental anguish for its 
deterrent effect.”96  The colonial shaming methods are eerily 
similar to the shaming methods that courts have imposed 
recently; as aforementioned, judges have recently been imposing a 
number of criminal shaming punishments that employ the use of 
signage in public to effectively humiliate the defendant.97  
Shaming punishments, both civil and criminal, are public in a way 
that imprisonment is not because the penalty is effective only as 
far as it is viewed by the public.98 
III.  APPLICATION TO RHODE ISLAND ORDINANCES: “ORANGE STICKER” 
The barrier that the Paul Court created to constitutional 
challenges of reputational-based punishment was exemplified in 
URI Student Senate.99  The University of Rhode Island students, 
student government, and owners of rental property in the largely 
student-occupied town of Narragansett100 brought a constitutional 
 
 94.  See generally Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976). 
 95.  See Sanders, supra note 68, at 363 (citing Dan M. Kahan, What do 
Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591, 611 (1996)). 
 96.  ADAM J. HIRSCH, THE RISE OF THE PENITENTIARY: PRISONS AND 
PUNISHMENTS IN EARLY AMERICA 34 (1992). 
 97.  See supra notes 80–87 and accompanying text. 
 98.  See Flanders, supra note 58, at 622:  
Shaming does degrade the status of the offender, and it uses public 
humiliation as the mechanism of this degradation.  But it does not 
follow from the fact that shaming works only in public and 
imprisonment does not that the latter type of punishment sends no 
message to the offender about his relative worth.  Indeed, prison’s 
expressive message may be just as powerful as shaming’s expressive 
message. 
Id.  
 99.  See URI Student Senate v. Town of Narragansett, 707 F. Supp. 2d 
282, 303 (D.R.I. 2010) (“The Court is at a loss for any way to put Plaintiffs’ 
injuries into a legal box other than purely reputational harms.”). 
 100.  “Approximately twenty-two percent of the housing stock in the Town 
consists of seasonal or vacation rental units, attracting many students during 
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challenge in state court regarding the municipal ordinance that 
permitted orange stickers to be applied to the outside of the rental 
properties that students either occupied or rented.101  The 
students’ attempts, however, were fruitless; after the case was 
removed to federal court based on federal question, the attempts 
at justice were hindered by the stigma-plus standard announced 
in Paul.102 
A.  The Development of the Orange Sticker Ordinance 
The municipal ordinance was enacted in 2005, and later 
amended in 2007, as a response to the yearly Narragansett 
residents’ disdain for the seasonal residents’ rowdy behavior.103  
The Narragansett residents had repeatedly complained of 
“quality-of-life issues resulting from high turnover and absentee 
landlords.”104  The residents’ concerns included “overcrowding, 
property abuse, excessive traffic, noise, litter, public drunkenness, 
underage drinking, and fights.”105  The town intended the 
municipal ordinance to address the concerns of the yearly 
residents by banning what they called “unruly gatherings” and 
permitting the police to break up parties that they perceive are 
causing a “substantial disturbance of the quiet enjoyment of 
private or public property in a significant segment of a 
neighborhood.”106  The ordinance allows the police to act if the 
disturbance is the result of a “violation of law,” and it provides a 
“nonexhaustive list of misdemeanors that authorize the police to 
intervene.”107  The listed misdemeanors appropriately address the 
concerns of the yearly residents such as excessive noise or traffic, 
 
the school year.”  Id. at 288 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 101.  Id. at 290–91. 
 102.  See URI Student Senate v. Town of Narragansett, 631 F.3d 1, 9 (1st 
Cir. 2011) (citing Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976)) (“The Supreme 
Court has made clear that a procedural due process claim cannot rest upon 
reputational harm alone.”); URI Student Senate, 707 F. Supp. 2d at 297 (“The 
Court agrees that receiving an orange sticker might be humiliating.  
However, the Supreme Court has made clear that due process claims cannot 
rest on harm to ‘reputation alone.’” (quoting Paul, 424 U.S. at 701)). 
 103.  See URI Student Senate, 707 F. Supp. 2d at 288. 
 104.  Id. 
 105.  Id.  
 106.  Id. at 288–89 (quoting Ordinance § 31(a)). 
 107.  Id. at 289 (citing Ordinance § 31(a)).). 
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public drunkenness, and litter, to name a few.108 
The requisite misdemeanor enables the police to act and 
subsequently disperse the gathering that they perceive to be a 
nuisance.109  The police must then post a notice, which consists of 
a ten-by-fourteen inch orange sticker placed in the vicinity of the 
front entrance, prominently on the premises.110  The stickers are 
not only prominently displayed and brightly-colored, but the 
presence of a sticker means that any similar violation in the 
future will require a fine.111  The District Court explained that 
“[t]he sticker warns that any further police intervention for a 
nuisance violation at the same address during a designated time 
period will result in ‘joint and several liability’ for sponsors of a 
gathering, the residents and owners of the premises, and any 
guests who cause the nuisance.”112 
In addition to posting the orange sticker, the municipality 
compiles and maintains information relating to violations of the 
municipal ordinance.113  Narragansett maintains “nuisance house 
lists” that display the addresses where the “unruly gatherings” 
that have required police intervention in both present and past 
seasons.114  Narragansett also maintains a “URI Stats” chart to 
exclusively track data regarding infractions committed specifically 
by University of Rhode Island students that required police 
intervention and warranted an orange sticker to be posted.115 
 
 108.  Id. (citing Ordinance § 31(a)). 
 109.  See id.  
 110.  Id. (citing Ordinance § 32(a)–(b)). 
 111.  See id. at 289–90.  “The first post-sticker police intervention at an 
unruly gathering during the posting period triggers a fine of $300; the second, 
$400; and the third, $500.”  Id. at 290 (citing Ordinance § 35(a)). 
 112.  Id. at 289. 
 113.  Id. at 290. 
 114.  Id. at 290.  The court provided that:  
The Town compiles information related to enforcing the Ordinance.  
“Nuisance house lists” display all addresses where police have 
dispersed an “unruly gathering,” and show which houses have 
stickers during a given season.  The Town also maintains a “URI 
Stats” chart to track data on infractions specifically committed by 
URI students. 
Id. 
 115.  Id. 
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B.  Fatal Flaws of the Orange Sticker Litigation 
The constitutional infringement claim in URI Student Senate 
fizzled in the District Court and on appeal due to a failure to 
satisfy the procedural due process stigma-plus standard; thus, 
“the interests cited [fell] shy of constitutional protection.”116  
Specifically on the issue of procedural due process, the Plaintiff’s 
argument was that “the absence of an opportunity for a hearing on 
whether there are legitimate grounds to place a sticker on a 
house—and thereby to malign the reputation of its owner and 
residents—offends due process.”117  The District Court agreed that 
receiving an orange sticker “might be humiliating,” but under the 
stigma-plus standard the plaintiffs were required to identify a 
tangible interest that the government impaired in placing stickers 
on their houses.118  The Court explained, moreover, that “a valid 
‘plus’ factor requires the loss of ‘government benefices denied as a 
result of governmental action.’”119  Both courts held that the 
plaintiffs failed to identify a sufficient “plus” interest because all 
of the alleged interests “involve[d] third parties in some way.”120 
The students’ and landlords’ failure to identify a tangible 
interest that was deprived as a direct result of the orange sticker 
was fatal to their claim.121   The result, however, did not sit lightly 
with Chief Judge William E. Smith, who explicitly noted: 
[T]he result sits uneasily with the Court.  Experience 
teaches that law enforcement is not perfect.  What 
happens if the police, though acting in good faith, put 
 
 116.  Id. at 296. 
 117.  Id. at 297. 
 118.  Id. (citing Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976)). 
 119.  Id. at 298 (quoting Pendleton v. City of Haverhill, 156 F.3d 57, 63 
(1st Cir. 1998)).). 
 120.  Id.; URI Student Senate v. Town of Narragansett, 631 F.3d 1, 9–10 
(1st Cir. 2011).  The District Court described some of the alleged harms that 
it found insufficient due to third party involvement: 
[A]s a result of the Town informing URI when student houses get 
stickers, some Plaintiffs have endured academic discipline, and one 
was suspended from the hockey team.  Several have also been 
evicted from their apartments.  As for the landlord Plaintiffs, some 
have been unable to rent apartments for some reason. 
URI Student Senate, 707 F. Supp. 2d at 298.  
 121.  URI Student Senate, 707 F. Supp. 2d at 298; URI Student Senate, 
631 F.3d at 12. 
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stickers on some homes where no “unruly gathering” 
actually occurred?  Such errors appear to fall between the 
cracks and allow for no remedy.  They are not 
constitutional violations, nor, in the majority of cases, the 
types of mistakes that would be fruitful to pursue in a 
defamation lawsuit.122 
The District Court concluded by asking “whether wrongfully-
applied stickers simply evade a meaningful remedy altogether.”123  
The First Circuit expressed similar reservations in its decision 
upholding the orange sticker ordinance as constitutional.124  
Without any ambiguity, Judge Bruce M. Selya wrote “[l]et us be 
perfectly clear.  We, like the district court, are uneasy about the 
absence of a hearing.”125 
In light of the reservations of both the district and appellate 
courts, it seems evident that the stigma-plus standard of 
procedural due process is inadequate to remedy the stigmatizing 
effect of the ordinance.   
C.  Shame Implications of the Orange Sticker Ordinance 
Shaming appears to be the primary purpose of the orange 
sticker.  Just as colonial towns required wrongdoers to hold signs 
in order to effectuate public shaming, URI students must live with 
a sign on their home making them targets of public and 
governmental scrutiny.  Worse yet, the shame sanction is—
literally—tacked on to the residence, rather than attaching to a 
particular “unruly” resident or residents convicted of the requisite 
misdemeanor.126  The attachment to the dwelling creates a ripple 
effect of shame: the dwelling, the renters, any guests of the house, 
and the landlord all are branded by the orange sticker.  
Presumably, the ordinance seeks to protect against the downwind 
effect of the branding by permitting residents, owners, and 
sponsors to assert the defense that only “uninvited participants” 
engaged in the illegal conduct.127  However, the ordinance’s 
 
 122.  Id. at 302.  
 123.  Id.  
 124.  See URI Student Senate, 631 F.3d at 11–12. 
 125.  Id. 
 126.  See Ordinance § 32(a). 
 127.  URI Student Senate, 707 F. Supp. 2d at 290 (citing Ordinance § 
34(a)(5)). 
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remedy is procedurally unsound since the participants are deemed 
liable prior to a hearing. 
D.  Feasible Alternatives to the Orange Sticker Ordinance 
The stigma-plus standard of procedural due process invites 
shame punishments, as exemplified by the orange sticker 
ordinance challenged in URI Student Senate.  Though the Paul 
decision was issued in 1976, that standard is now archaic and 
facilitates antiquated punishments that were barely suited for 
colonial times—if properly suited for any era at all.  It is necessary 
for the Supreme Court to overturn the Paul decision to prevent 
outdated shame punishments from continuing without an 
adequate process for claimants to resist such punishments. 
In Paul, Justice Brennan’s dissent alluded to plausible 
alternatives to the confining stigma-plus standard and 
emphasized the need for a broader definition of liberty.128  
Specifically, Justice Brennan noted that liberty should include 
“the enjoyment of one’s good name and reputation” as has “been 
recognized repeatedly in [Supreme Court] cases as being among 
the most cherished of rights enjoyed by a free people.”129  The 
willingness of the Paul majority to “dismiss the idea that 
standalone stigmatic harm could constitute deprivation of liberty 
without ever attempting to define, or even consider more deeply, 
the nature of liberty”130 creates a doctrine that is too narrow to 
remedy stigmatization injuries.  A broader interpretation of 
liberty so as to address stigmatization would be more appropriate, 
to which the majority in Constantineau alluded where it utilized a 
broad interpretation of liberty that incorporated reputational 
injuries.131  The Constantineau Court said it best: 
Yet certainly where the State attaches “a badge of 
infamy” to the citizen, due process comes into play.  “The 
right to be heard before being condemned to suffer 
grievous loss of any kind, even though it may not involve 
the stigma and hardships of a criminal conviction, is a 
 
 128.  See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 714–35 (1976) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting). 
 129.  Id. at 722–23. 
 130.  Mitnick, supra note 21, at 118. 
 131.  See Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971). 
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principle basic to our society.”132 
The orange sticker doubles as a scarlet letter, branding both 
the residents and the invitees as the sort that are unruly or at 
least associate with the unruly.  If the Supreme Court is reluctant 
to modify the standard for reputational harm, then an adequate 
short-term solution may be achieved at the municipal level 
through modification of the ordinance.  As both the district and 
the appellate court noted in their thorough opinions, the absence 
of a hearing is the most significant cause of concern surrounding 
the ordinance,133 so requiring at least that much is a first vital 
step in enhancing the fairness of the ordinance’s application. 
E.  Ineffectiveness of the Orange Sticker Ordinance 
Moreover, the effectiveness of the orange sticker ordinance is 
largely unknown.  It is an open question as to whether the 
ordinance has resulted in a decrease in the number of house 
parties and eased the concerns of the yearly residents.134  Notably, 
in 2014, nine years after the town implemented the ordinance, the 
town council voted to raise the penalties for other nuisance-
oriented ordinances after one particularly rowdy weekend.135  The 
Narragansett Town Council increased the penalties after a town-
described “riot”: Narragansett town manager, Pamela Nolan, 
explained “[i]n 25 years of being a town manager, I’ve never seen 
anything as disruptive, volatile and violent as that riot on 
Saturday.”136  The “riot” induced town residents to again express 
their continued disdain for the student-renters, describing the 
 
 132.  Id. at 437 (quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 
341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)). 
 133.  See URI Student Senate v. Town of Narragansett, 631 F.3d 1, 11–12 
(1st Cir. 2011); URI Student Senate v. Town of Narragansett, 707 F. Supp. 2d 
282, 302 (D.R.I. 2010). 
 134.  See Daniel Luzer, The Party Sticker, WASH. MONTHLY (Jan. 7, 2011, 
10:00 AM), http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/college_guide/blog/the_party_ 
sticker.php (“[I]t remains unclear whether or not the orange sticker policy, 
which has been in place since 2005, has reduced the number of loud parties 
occurring in Narragansett.”). 
 135.  Donita Naylor, Narragansett Takes First Steps to Increase Penalties 
for Drunken Behavior After Weekend Disturbance, PROVIDENCE J.  (May 18, 
2014, 12:01 AM), http://www.providencejournal.com/article/20140508/NEWS/ 
305089977. 
 136.  Id. 
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neighborhood as “hell.”137  What can be inferred from the 
neighborhood’s remarks at the town meeting is that the orange 
sticker ordinance has not solved the “unruly gathering” problem 
and begs the question of whether, then, other Rhode Island 
municipalities, such as Providence and Newport, should 
reconsider implementing comparable ordinances.138  Conceivably, 
municipalities consider the ordinance to be a viable option because 
they are at a loss of what exactly will calm the “hell” in their 
neighborhoods.  The towns’ dilemmas, however, more likely stem 
from the disconnect between the towns and students who only 
pass through for four, sometimes five, years.  The orange stickers 
do not deter the student renters because the students are in a 
unique position of being able to sidestep the stigmatization.  More 
often than not, students pack up and leave as soon as they 
complete their required course-load, leaving their Narragansett 
stigmatization, along with their security deposits, in their dust. 
As the constant link between the student renters and the 
towns, it is possible that landlords may be the key to solving the 
disruption between them.  Landlords are the sole entity that can 
bridge the gap between the two and perhaps give the yearly-
residents the peace they seek.  The landlords, however, are 
themselves particularly disconnected from the town.  One report 
noted that “[a]bout 50 percent of the rental properties are owned 
by absentee landlords who live out of state in New York, 
Massachusetts, New Jersey and Connecticut.  Another chunk may 
live elsewhere in Rhode Island.”139  The District Court elucidated 
the absentee landlord problem as well, explaining that “[t]he 
Town has long complained of quality-of-life issues resulting from 
high turnover and absentee landlords.”140 
 
 137.  Id. (“One neighbor struggled to compose himself as he said he can’t 
have his grandchildren over because of drunken behavior in the 
neighborhood.  ‘It’s like being in hell in this town,’ Joe Santos said.  ‘It’s 
unbelievable.’”). 
 138.  See Olga Enger, Nuisance Houses Targeted, NEWPORT THIS WK. (Jan. 
7, 2016), http://www.newportthisweek.com/news/2016-01-07/Front_Page/ 
Nuisance_Houses_Targeted.html; Gregory Smith, Providence Police Start 
Putting Orange Stickers on ‘Party Houses’, PROVIDENCE J. (Oct. 21, 2013, 
10:01 PM), http://www.providencejournal.com/article/20131021/NEWS/31021 
9989.  
 139.  Curry, supra note 1. 
 140.  URI Student Senate v. Town of Narragansett, 707 F. Supp. 2d 282, 
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Considering that the town’s absentee landlords are seemingly 
at the heart of the issue, the town is ineffectively targeting the 
properties and student-renters with relatively minor fiscal 
penalties in comparison to the $350,000 to $500,000 landlord 
investment.141  As noted, the students are elusive compared to the 
yearly residents and the landlords are not significantly affected by 
the relatively minor penalty.  In fact, one Narragansett property 
owner commented that “once a home is branded with a sticker, it 
does deter students from wanting to rent the place,” but that 
“most landlords will not evict their tenants due to the 
shortfall.”142 
The town would be more successful in deterring renters’ bad 
behavior if they enacted an ordinance aimed directly at the out-of-
state landlords rather than the landlords’ properties and, 
accordingly, increased the fines to create an incentive for the 
landlords to better regulate their properties.  The current 
ordinance does not incentivize landlords because, as mentioned, 
the landlords have a considerable, profitable investment in the 
seasonal housing and the current ordinance does nothing to harm 
that investment.143  As such, rather than punishing the students 
and branding them in a town that they likely will flee in less than 
half a decade, the town might do better to punish the landlords 
because they have a greater connection to the town. 
CONCLUSION 
Despite the questionable effectiveness and constitutionality of 
the ordinance, other Rhode Island municipalities with similar 
demographics have welcomed analogous ordinances to deal with 
similar seasonal renter complaints from residents, including 
Providence and Newport.  In Providence, a police official explained 
that the purpose of the orange stickers is “[t]o put people on notice 
that they are running afoul of the law and to call them out into 
the public eye for their misbehavior.”144 
The orange sticker ordinance’s appeal is not surprising; it 
soothes the grumbles of the residents by—literally—displaying 
 
288 (D.R.I. 2010). 
 141.  See Curry, supra note 1. 
 142.  Id. 
 143.  See id. 
 144.  Smith, supra note 146. 
SEMONELLI_FINAL EDIT WORD.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/20/2016  7:50 PM 
2016] INSULT TO INJURY: ORANGE STICKERS 635 
their disdain for the “unruly,” while also giving police advanced 
notice of a dwelling likely to be hosting “unruly gatherings.”  The 
ordinance, however, is primarily successful—not in accomplishing 
its underlying rationale—but rather in marginalizing seasonal 
renters through shaming.  It is undisputed that the municipal 
ordinance is favorable to the yearly residents of Narragansett.  
While yearly residents certainly have more leverage when it 
comes to demanding peace and quiet within Narragansett, 
shaming student renters is an archaic way to remedy the problem.  
This antiquated system ought to be cured through either a 
reconsideration of the stigma-plus standard, a modification of the 
Narragansett ordinance to target the proper audience, or both.  
Left unaltered, this ordinance will not only continue to add insult 
to injury for those currently being damaged by its stigmatic 
effects, but it may also lead other Rhode Island towns, in addition 
to those it has already, to adopt similarly problematic ordinances. 
 
